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CHAPT ER I.
I N TR 0 D U C T I 0 N
Samuel Freeman Miller ws a native of Kentucky. He
was born August 5, 1816. In his veins was mingled the
blood of the North and of the South. His father had mi-
grated from Pennsylvania and hds mother from North Caro-
lina. His boyhood was passed on a farm. His educa-
tion was restricted to the connron schools. From the
farm hatwent to the village drug store; from there to the
medical department of Transylvania University where he
took the degree of M. D. He disliked the practice of
Medicine nd began the study of law, making up for the
deficiency of his earlier training by taking advanttge of
privileges offered in a debating club conducted in the
town in which he then resdded. He was admitted to the
bar at the age cf thirty one. He was an ardent opponent
of hyman slavery. When Kentucky failed to provide for e-
mancipation in the Constitution of 1850, he removed to
Iowa. He took his slaves with him and there gave them
their freedom. In politics he vas al first a whig; but
afterwards became a Republican. He was always intense-
ly partizan. Indeed it is said that during the first
administration of Mr. Cleavland he expressed the senti-
mrent that his one desire was to be permitted to live un-
til he might know that a Republican presidert would nom-
inate his successor. As a lawyer he soon rose to eminene
at the Towa bar andhis practice extend311into Illinois,
Ae forraed the acquaintance and becrnme the fast friend of
Lincoln who, after his election as president, upon the
recommendation of the entire bar of the West, appointed
Mr. Miller associate Justice of the Supremre Court, in
1862. The years which followed were eventful as any in
the history of out Republic. The calendar of the Su-
prone Court was crwwded with cases, the decision of which
required the solution of momentous questions. The pow-
er of the Nation to conduct a war for its own existence
and the questions growing out of that war; the rights of
the en'ancipated slave, the changes wrought in our Consti-
tution by the three last amendments; and after these the
vast changes in methods of industrial production and dis-
tribution adding to the complexity of questions arising
under the most complex system of 7overnment that has ev-
3er existed - all these have, during the past thirty
years,placed upon judges of our Federal courts most grave
responsibility.
To record some parts, of the work done by Mr. Justice
Miller in the solution of these grave questions is t1e
purpose of the following pages.
C H A P T E R II
0-
DECISIONS OF LB. JUSTICE MILLER RELATING TO EX POST
FACTO LAWS
"No Bill of Attainder or Ex Post Facto Law shall be
passed (Art. I. Sec. 9 Clause 3, U. S. Constitutionj
A most interesting case on this subject is that of
(a)
Ex Parte Garland, the facts of which x:er, as follows.-
On the 24th of June, 1865, Congress passed an act
extending to all persons applying for riermission to prac-
tice la-:s in l'ederal Courts the provisions of a prior
act relating to persons appointed or elected to Federal
offices. This prior act required every such ,erson be-
fore assuming the duties of his office to declare under
oath that he 1h:d never borne arms against the United
States; nor ,iven aid tund encolragement to l ersons hos-
tile thereto; nor held any office under any authority
or pretended authority, which was hostile to the United
States. In 1860 Mr. Garland was an attorney and coun-
(a) 4 Wall. 382.
sellor in the Federal courts, lie had afterwards c st
his lot .ith the seceding states in the war of the Fe-
bellion andhid served both as representative and Senator
in the Confederate Congress.
In July, 1865, President Johnson had granted him a
full pardon upon certain conditions and with these condi-
tions he had complied. He afterwards petitioned the
Supreme Court for restoration to the privileges of a
practitioner of law , one ground of his prayer being that
the Act of Congress was, as to him, an ex post facto law
and therefore void-
iew cases have been so ablpy presented. Mr. Gar-
land appeared in his own behalf with 1. A. Carpenter and
Reverdy Johnson; while Attorney General Speed for the
United States was assisted by Messrs. Standerry as spe-
cial counsel.
The opinion of the (ourt, holding the law in ques-
tion void, was written by Mr. Bustice Field. It ield
that, wh&le the Act of Congress neither attempted to de-
fine crimes nor inflict punishn-entj Its effect was to
do that aery thing; that to deprive a person of the power
to hold offices and trusts or of the irivilege of ,ursu-
ing the ordinary avocations of life was to inflict pun-
isbrent ; that the exclusion o- admission of attorneys by
the courts i2 not an exercise of ministerial power, but
raLher judicial - in short, that admission to the bar
is a right which can be taken away nnly for moral or
professional delinquency. Justice Miller, with whom
concurred three other members of the court, wrote a vig-
orous dissenting ,pinion. The position taken was that
ex post facto laws could nnly apply to I-roceedings of a
criminal nature; that the law in question referred to
proceedings wholly of a civil nature; that admission to
the bar is an act of grace and favor to which no one can
claim an absolute right. Hence to refuse the privilege
of practising law coiqld not be considered as an inflic-
tion of pnishment.
The classification of ex post fcto laws enumerated
(a)
in Calder v. Bullwere quoted which, omitting the second,
as practically obsolete is as follows:-
(i) "Every law that makes an, ction done before the
passing of the law ard which was innocent when done, crin
inal and punishes such act.
(a) 2 Dallas, 3%6.
(2) Everyr 1iw{ <_hat changes tile punisim-ent and in-
ilict. a greater punisliment thanthe law annexed to the
crine when conrnitted.
(3) Ever; law tihet alters the legal r -les of evi-
dence and receives less or different testimony thanthe
law required at the time of the conission of the offence
in order to vonvict the offender."
To the laws thus classifidd Justice Miller thought
neither ex,ounder nor conmentator on the -onstitution
had added any other. That classification was them to be
regarded as complete. No one of these classes did the
Act of Congress in question belong. It could not there-
fore be regarded as ex post facto.
Section 10 of Art. i, of the Constitution provides
"No state -...... shall pass any Bill of Attainder or Ex
Post Facto Law." Under this clause, at the same time
as Ex parte Garland, was decided the case of Cun-mings v.
Missouri (a). A new constitutirn, adopted by that state
required teachers, ministers of the gospel, attorneys
and voters, to take an obligation called the"oath of loy-
alty," the requirements of which were similar to those
(a) 4 Wall. 277.
of the Act of Congress but ar ;chi" in their char-
acter. Any one exercising any one of these privileges
without first having subsc'-ibed to the oath was liable,
upon conviction , to fine and imprisona nt. Cumrmings
was a priest of the Roman Catholic church, having perform
ed #is duties as a iriest without first taking this oath
he was arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced. This
sentence of the stte court was on appeal reversed, the
questions involved being similar to those decided in Ex
psrte Garland. From this decis ion Mr. Justice Miller
also dissented.
In after years he seems to have modified his views
in regard to the completeness of the classification of
Ex Post Facto laws in Calder v. Bull. He himself, in the
case of Kring v. Missouri(L,) wrote an opinion adding a-
nother class to the list there naffed. Kring had been in-
dicted in the Criminal Court of St Louiss for the crime of
murder in the first degree and -leaded not guilty. The
historyr of bis case is renr-rkable. He was tried by a
jury fonr tines and was once sentenced on a plea of guil-
ty in the second degree. This jlea he claimed was en-
(a) 107 U. -. 221.
tered under an agreement with the, District Attorney that
I.e should be sentenced for only te-n years. The court
however, gaue him a term of twenty fivc years. He ap-
pealed t6 the Sprme court of Missouri '_nd a ner trial
was granted. Upon being again arraigned, Kring refused
to withdraw his -plea of guilty in the second degree. The
court ordered a plea of not guilty to be entered.
At the time the crime was committed the Constitution
ef Missouri provided that the conviction of such an of-
fence in the second degree should be considered an ac-
quittal of that crime in the first degree. This provis-
ion had been repealed before Kring was last placed on
trial. Convicted of murder in the first degree and sen-
tenced to death, Kring appealed to the Supreme court on
the ground that the repeal of this prouision of the Con-
stitution of Missouri was , as to him, an ex post facto
law ,nd therefore void. The appeal wuis sustained by a
majority of the court, Justice Miller in the prevailing
opinion asserting that the classification of ex yost fac-
to laws in Calder v. Bull ws not intended to be com-
plete. The decision was put on the broad ground that
any law passed after the commission of an offence which
in relation to that offence or its consequences alters
the situation or the accused to his disadvantage, is as
to him, ex post facto.
As to what changes in a law will amount to an in-
creas -i punishment so as to render it void under this
clause of the constitution as to crimes ireviously com-
mitted, the case of In 'e Medl-ey(a) is of considerable
value. 'he facts were these:- On the 29th day of No-
vember, 1889, Medley was convict-ed Under the laws of the
st-te of Colorado of the crimae of murder in the first de-
gree. By order of the court he was remadded to the eus-
tody of the sheriff, to be by him within twenty four
hours to be delivered to the warden of the st'.te pene-
tentiary , by whom hhe was to be kept in solitary con-
finement until the fourth week of the month of December,
and on a day to be named thereafter by the warden, execut
ted within the walls of the penetentiary. Mhe statute
under which this sentence was passed beeame a law July
19, 1889. The murder was comnitted on the 13th day of
May of the same year.
Medley petitioned the Supreme court of th United
134 U. 1. 160.
states for an order th.t he be released alleging that the
law under which he was sentenced was ex post facto in
Llat it inflicted u severer punishment than gas annexed
to his crime at the time it was committed. Both the
new statute and the old inflicted the death -enalty for
this offence, but the court held that the later statute
increased the punishment by death in two F0artiuu- rs.
First, the new statute, unlike the old, provided for sol-
itary confinement previous to execution. The, extent and
degree of this confinemnt was limited only by the diB-
cretion of the warden Lnd even that discretion was limit-
ed . He might not admit any person except members of
the family of the condemned man, his spiritual advisers,
his counsel and the 1:rison attendants. Of this solita-
rg confinement the court said, speaking through Justice
Miller;- "It remains of the essential character of that
mode of prison life as it formerly originated was pre-
scribed and carried to mark prisoners as examples of the
just punishrrent of the worst crimes of the human race.
The court held this solitary confinement to amount to a
material increase of punishment. Second, the new law,
unlike the old, provided th t the tirfe of execiution shoul.
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should be unknown to the condermed rian. This too, was
held to amount to additional punishment. Six judges con-
c,rred, but Juistices Bradley and Brewer dissented. Of
the opinions mentioned I shall have something to day in
another chapter-
C HAPi ER III.
DECISIONS RELATING T0 THE COv1iNrTC2 CLAUSE
0' THE CO1STITUT ION
"The Con/gress shall have pow r to repulate conerce
with iorei'_rtions and amonthe several states
and with the Indian tribes." (Ar1. I.. Sec.8,Const.)
Some of the ablest opinions ever written by Justice
Miller have be~n expositions of this clause. Prior to
the tin' when Congrees begah to legislate in the way of
controlling imiigration, a few states on their own au-
thority attempted to assume dontrol. Out of such an at-
tempt grew the case of Henderson v . New York (a) the
facts of which -ere these:- By statute of that state the
master of every vessel arriving at the port f Ne York
was required within twenty four hours of arriving to re-
port in ;,riting to the mayor of the city the names, plac-
es of birth and last residence as well as previous oc-
cupation of every 1ssenger not a citizen of the United
(a) 92 U. ". 259.
States. It as made the duty of the Mayor to require
from the owner or consignee of the vessel a bond condi-
tioned against the state being compelled to incur any ex-
pense for the relief or suplort of thc y :ssenger nmrfed in
the bond for the space of two years. A bond was requir-
ed for each immigrant i. In lieu of this bond, one dollar
adnd fifty cents might be paid. The enforcennt of the
statute being resisted the question of its validity canm
before the Suprene court where Justice Miller, speaking
for the court held, first, that within the principle of
The United States v. Milia) that partof the statute re-
quriing the report of the names, places of birth etc. of
the passengers was valid as an exercise of the police
power on the part of the state. Second, that the other
requiroments of the statute, although police regulations,
were of such a nature that the state might not enforce
them because the subject matter to which they related was
by the constitution confided exclusively to the discre-
tion of Congress. "Such a statute" said the opinion,
"is void no natter under what class of powers it may fall
or how closely allied the powers conceded to belong to
(a) 11 Pet. 103.
the stats
A similar statute enacted by the legislature of Cal-
ifornia was declared unconstitutional in the case of
Chy Lung v. Freeman (a) The Californi, statute however,
differed from that in NewYork in three particulars.
First, it applied only to certain classes of immigrants,
amongst them lewd and debauched women to which class it
was claimed the appellant belonged. Secon4, the price
per immigrant to be paid in lieu of bond was not fixed
but left to the discretion of the state comnmssioner of
immigration. Third, the only imnigrant who might not be
held for examination were public functionaries arriving
in their officail capacity. These distinguishing fea-
tLwes of the statute the court considered made it more
objectionable than the New York statute; nd , while not
denying the right of a state, in the absence of legisla-
tion by Congress to protect itself from crimi als and
paupers, held that such a right could arise only out of
vital hecessity and that its exercise was limited only
by that necessity. This limit the California statute
went far beyond and was therefore void.
Another'attempt to levy a tax on imigration was de-
(a) 92 U. S. 275.
Acision in People v. Campagni Co. (a) ;, statute of Ie-'ci
York levi d a tax of one dollar on each immigrant landed
to b3 collected dn the transportation company landing
him. The tax was collected ostensibly to pay expenses in.
curred in carrying out the inspection laws of the state
Such a law having been passed three days earlier requir-
ing the inspection of irmaigrants to determine if any of'
them were habitual criminals. The enforcement of the
statute was resisted and the question coming before the
Supreme court of the United States, it was held that the
authority given to the states as to inspection laws by
the Constitution(b) referred only to laws providing
for the inspection of property and that the q~estion was
void under the rule laid down in Henderson v. Ne,'; York.
Congress finally legislated on the subject of irni-
gration and in the Head Money Cases (c) an act of Con-
gress imposing upon the owners of steamers a tax of fif-
ty cents for every alien p-,ssenger landed was held to be
a valid regulation of commerce.
Attempts by states in one form or another to levy
(a) 107 U. S. 59.
(b) Art. I. Sec. 10, Clause 3 U. S. Const.
(c) 112 U. S. 50.
taxes on Commerce be tveen the states have frequently fur-
nished the occasion for cases requiring exposition of thd
this clause of the constitution.
Under this class I think niay be ment ioned the Case
b Crandall v. Nevada (a) although the decision was dis-
tinctly put on another ground. A statute of that state
provided for the collecticn from everyperson or company
engaged in the business of transpurting passengers, the
tax of one dollar for ever-- person carried who was leav-
ing the state. It was t-equired that each month the
number of persons so transported and the payment of the
tax therefor should be reported under oath. I Tenalty
was r rovided for non-compliance with the statute. Cran-
dall, vho was the agent of a stage company, refused to
make the required report and when arrested and rlaced on
trial pleaded that the statute in question was contrary
to the constitution of the United States and void. The
decisien of the state court having affirrnd the validity
of the tax an appeal was taked to the Suprem court of
the United States whete the decision of the state court
wa.i reversed. The reversal 'as put upon the ground
(a) 6 Wall. 35.
thmt the taxes ivr s cont'ary to the corelative righ 
t of
the United States government and its citizens, andincon-
sistent with the object for which the government vias
for me d
InStatc Tax ,n Railway Gros'- Receipts (a) Justice
Miller dissented from the decision of the court v'hich 1'
held that the state of Pennsylvania could leavy, a tax on
the gross receipts of a c~rporation of that state which
was engaged in inter-state corTflrce- In this dissent he
said:- "I lay down the broad proposition that by no de-
vice nor evasion, by no form of statutory words can a
state compel the citizens of other states to pay to it a
contribution or toll for the privilege of having their
goods transported through that state by the ordinary
channels of comnmrce. "
The doctrine of the exclusive right of Congress to
control commerce between the states and that until Con-
gress should legislate that cormmerce must be free-, re-
ceived added strength from decision which he rendered
in the case of Wabash . Co. v. Illinois. (b) In that
( ) 15 .all. 284.
(b) 118 U. S. 557.
case the railway coilpany app led P'rom a decision of the
Supreme court or Illinois affirming the judgment of a
lower* court holding the company guilty of unjust dis-
crimination. The facts were undisputed t :. lt the compa-
nly had charged one t'irm I cents pe- 100 for the trans-
portation of goods from Peoria Illinois to New York
city, ,;;hile on the same day and for similar goods another
firm in a city 86 miles neare. New York city was charged
25 cents per 100 for transportation to tIaltplace. But
counsel for the canpany urged that this business was in-
ter state comnerce, the regulation of which was wholly
within the discretion of Congress. The stat- court had
held that the penalty annexed to the statute should be
applied on the theory that the statute was a bindinm: reg-
ulation as to that part of this business transacted
within the jurisdiction of the state. This decision
was reversed andit -,'as held, that while as to contracts
for transjlortation to be carri-d on wholly within the
state the statute was valid; yet as interpreted by the
state court it -was an unwarrant edregulat ion upon inter-
state coiraerce and therefore void. The decisions in
,,hich the United States court had seemed to Px Pres
contrary opinion(a) were declared to have been argued and
decided nn other grounds. That while "the question of tt-
exclusive right ol Qongress to rmake such re-gulations of
chaor'-es as any legislative power had the right to rake
to the exclusion of the state was T,resented it received
but little attention at the hands of the ourt."
This exclusive right of Congress to control com-
merce between the states was reasserted in Fargo v. Mich-
igan (b) . A statute of that state provided that the
gross receipts of railway companies carryinp. passengers
or freight from without into or from w,itiin to without
the state should be suhject to a tax. Fargo, as Presi-
(lent of the M. D. & T. Co. , a corporation organized un-
der the laws of the State of New- York, in which state its
principal office was located, filed a bill in equity
praying that the Auditor General of Michigan be enjoined
(a) Munnnv. Illinois, 94 U. ", 113-5;
State Tax on Gross Receipts, 15 Wall 293;
v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155;
&a6 ev. C. "N Ry. .,o. 94 1. D. 177-8
(b) 121 U. S. 230.
from collecting this tax from the dorporstion. The stat
state court held the tax valid and an appeal was taken.
Justice Miller, wtiting the opinion of the cou'irt, dis-
tinguished the facts in this case from those in State
Tax on Gross Receipts where , it jill be rel-rnrbered . he
dissente don two grounds: first, the Pennsylvnia uorpo-
ration was organized under the state laws of Pennsylva-
nia, this was a foreign corporation. Second, the -faat
in that case was levied on money already in the treasury
of the corporatic.n and upon property within the state
w,hich hd ceased to hold its distinctive character a s cori
pensation for freight; in this cese the property to be
taxed was riot within the state and probably never had
been there. The decision of the State court of Michi-
gan was t-horefore reversed- The same principle g')s a-
gain considered in the case of Battrnman v. W. U. Tel.
Co.(a). That case came before the Supreme court by E
certificate of division from a Federal court sitting in h
the state of Ohio. The r articular question lresented
-as whether a tax levied on receipts of a corporation in
that state, such receipts heing derived 'Partly from corn-
(a) 127 U. S. 411.
o) ,)
merce carried on wholly within the state and 
,artly from
inter-state connaerce, but upon Tihich t ie tax was assess-
ed in gross and without separation or reapportionment 
of
the receipts, was Tholby invalid or invalid only 
as to
that p art levied on receipts derived from int r-state
commerce. Tha tax was held only Iartly invalid 
and the
decision of the Circuit court enjoining the collection f
of only this valid part, sustained.
The states, however , are not left without power to
subject corporations engaged in inter-state commerce to
just taxation. iliis doctrine was declared by the decis-
ion in W. Yd. TI. Co. v. Mass(a) . The telegraph Co. w.,s
a corporation organized under the lais f the state of
New York. Its line extended into every state of the
Union. Under authority of a statute passed for that
purpose the Treasure- of Massachusetts assessed a tax up-
on the corporai , n. FollouTing the directions of the
law the amount of the tax was computed as follows:- tak-
ing the sworn statement of officers of the company as to
its financial condition, he deducted from the entire cp-
ital stock proper credits. 'Thiis gave the total valua-
tion of stock liable to taxation. Ascertaining the to-
(a) 125 U. :3. 545.
tal number of miles of line owned by the company in all
the states and territories afid the total number ot miles
of il1, itiin ,Iv st.i ( Massachusetts the amount of
tax was computed by this formula:-
Rate times the Total Valuation of Stock times Nun
ber of Miles of Line Within the State divided by
the Total hymber of Miles of Line equals the Amount
of the tax.
Th,- company resisted rayment and carried its case to
the Supreme Co',rt where the validity of the assessment
was affirmed on the ground that it was essentially an ex
cise on the capita-l stock of the corporationwithin the
state.
C H A P T E R IV.
DECISIONS RELATING TO LAWS WHICH IMPAIR
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS.
"No state shall pass - la- -i -iring the ob-
-ligations of contracts . (Art .I, Sec. X., U.S.Con.)
The decisinn of the Dartmouth college Case(a) held
that the charters of corporations were contracts between
the states granting the charters and the corporations to
which these chsatters were granted. The privileges
granted in these instruments are therefore protected by
t.his clause of the Constitut ion. Such a c ontract was
considered in the case of University v. Rouse (b) . The
statute of Missouri, by which the University was incorpo-
ratted, provided that its property shouldbe exempt from
taxation. A constitut ion of the state, subsequently a-
dopted, authorized the legislatuire to provide for the
levy of a tax oh r roperty belonging to such institutions.
In pursuamce of this authority the Legislature did pro-
(a) 4 Vhiett. 518.
(b) 8 Wall. 139.
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vide for tli, levy of . tax on property belonging to cor-
porations. The University resisted its collection. The
state courts aIfiried its validity and the University ap-
pealed. A majority of the Supreme court he'd that these
facts showed & contract by aichiCh it was agreed that the
University should not be taxed; that the legislature of
the state had power to make 'his contract in behalf of
the state, and that the st,,te was bound Lhe eby. From
this decision Chief Jstice Chase and Justices Field and
Mil2 r dissented. Justice Miller, speaking for the mi-
nority said; "No legislative body, sitting undera state
constitution of the usual kind has the right in any way
to divest the state of its taxing power. Questions of
such a character, however great the authority by which
they are supported can never be considered by the decis-
ions of any court." Had the question been before the
court for the first t ime the dpinion of the minority
would probably heve prevailed. Undoubtedly the tendency
of the court is to restrict as far as possible the doc-
trine laid down in the opinion of the majority.
Thus in Memphis Gas Co. v. Shelby Co. (a) a F-as corn-
(a) 109 U. S. 395.
pany li-d been incorporated by the legislature of Tenness-
ee i charter was silent on the question of taxations.
Afteyr,ards a license tax of' $250 per year ha-ving be 'n
laid on the franchise of the corporation it, collection
was r-sisted on the ground that it was so heavy as to a-
mount to a destruction of the privileges granted- It
was urged that the state was bound by an implied contract
no4 to take away those privileges. The decision of the
state court as adverse to the corporation. II appealed
but relief was denied. The cort remarking "The surren-
der of the right of taxation must be clear and explicit."
Agreements in charters granted to corporations by
which the legislature attempts to divest the state of
its police powers are void and hence not protected by
this clause of the constitution. This question is dis-
cussed by Justice Miller in Butchers v. Crescent Slaugh-
tering Co.(a) The case is interesting in a historical
(b)
way as the sequel of the famous Slaughtering House Cases.
It will be remembered that the legislature of Louisiana
created a corporat ion to which was given the exclusive
right to slaughter aninals intended to be used as food
(a) ill U. 3. 74c.
(b) 1 Wall. 16.
in a large area of territory which included the city of'
New Orleans. The I-rivileges were conferred for twent-
five years. Eefore that time had exrired the state con-
stitution was so amended as to place the business under
the exclusive control of the police department of the
state. It also provided that no monopolies in the busi-
ness should be granted and abolished those then existing.
The slaughtering company 1-iming the protection
of this clause of the constitution. The case was fought
to the Supreme court which decided against the claim of
the original company, holding that the legislature had
no power to contract away the police power of the state
where the public health or morals were affected there-
by.
Keith v. Clark (a) was a c',se growing out of the
war of the rebellion. The charter of the Bank of Tenn-
essee, granted in 1838, provided that bills andnotes of
the bank should be -eceivable for taxes at their face
value. May 6, 1861, Tennessee seceded from the Union.
In 1865 the constitution, so amended as to i-rovide that
bills and note of the ank issued after the seccession
(a) 97 U. -). 454.
should not be received in the .mmn-r before provided.
The 1laintiff, for taxes due, tendered bill' of the hank
issued on the date s named in the orendment ot the consti-
tution, worth -A that tin about 25 cents on the doll-r.
The tender being refused he 1:ald his taxes and sued the
defendant who wias tax collector ±or money paid under rre-
test. The suit was defended on the theory that bills of
the bank issued after Tennessee had succeeded were issu-
ed for the rurpose of aiding the war of the Rebellion,
that the consideration theredf was irmmoral and illegal
and the contracts which they represented void. The ques-
tion coming before the Suir'eme court it w;i ,s discussed.at
length, the court holding that the attempts of the state
to secede was a nullity; that it was during all the years
of the war an organizaticn essential to the existence of
society; that during those years its legislation ,not in
conflict to the laws or constitution of the United States
was valid; that before an:, of its b gislation wildebe
declared invalid the fact that it violated a lw of the
United States or was done in aid of the Rebellion should
ba affirmativel7 shovi ; tli.t this i.d not been done, and
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that the bills, therefore, were a valid tender and the
amendment void as violating the obligation of a con-
tract.
CHAPTER V.
-0-
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE FIRSi SECTION
OF THE XIV AMENDMENT
-O
"All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are
citizens of the United States and of the states
wherein they reside. No state shall make or en-
force any law w'hich shall abridge the privileges or
imvunities of the citizens of the Unitod States.
Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, lib-
erty or property without due proceeds of law nor de-
ny tc any person withiin it s jurisdiction the equal
protection cf the law*" (Amend. .IV., Sec. 1.)
The great leading case construing this section of
the amendment was the Slaughte1- House Cases (a). Theu-
casesarose in Louisiana. The ler-islature of that state.
-ranted to a corporation created for tIhat purpose the ex-
clusive right to land keep nd slaughter any cautle,
bee'ves, cLives sheep or swine hich werI to be killed for
(a) 15 Wall. 36.
sale within a certain district in that state containing
more than one thousand square miles. Any person -excrcO
ing any of these exclusive privileges was liable to a
penalty. The corporation was to be paid a fixed Tyrice
for the use of their slaughter house. It was liable to
a fine in case it refused to an one the privilege of
slaughter, /or failed to provide aaple privile-ges for all
desiring to use the house for slaughtering purposes.
An insl-ctor ,;as to be appointed whose compensation
was fixed at a given price I'r head*. The butchers re-
sisted the enforcement of this act and carr'ied their case9
to the Supreme court urging that the monopoly was void
as against conmon right; that it abridged their privi-
ieges and immunities as cdtizens of the United States;
deprived them of their property without due process of
lew, anddenied to them the equal pretection of the laws.
On account of the grave questions involved the cas-
es were given great consideration and the decision was
not rendered until December, 1872. The prevailing opin-
ion, rittef by Mr- Justice Miller, is considered his
masterpieee and it is the production which of all others
he was accustomed to regard with .. ost satisfaction. I
First, to the argument of counsel for the butchers
drawn from the case reprnted by Coke, holding a monopo-
(a)
ly void as against common right, the opinion replied
that that principle held good only as to monopolies
granted by tI-n crown, not as to those granted by the Par-
liarhent, that a state legislature had powers analagous
to those of Parliament hnd might grant to a corporation
or to any of its citizens such exclusive Irivileges as
migh. be deemed wise. Second, two hitherto doubtful
questions had been set at rest by this amendment . Con-
trary to the views of Calhoun it provided that persons
might be citizens of the United States without being cit-
izens of any particular state. It over-ruled the Dred
Scott decision by declaring that all persons within the
United States and subject to its jurisdiction are citi-
zens of the United States. There was , then, in the o-
pinion of the court , a clear distinction between cit-
izenship of a state and citizenship of the United States
Peculair and distinct privileges and irmnunities attach
to each class. Only the privileges hnd innunitis be-
longing to persons as citizens of the United States,
as distinguished from those privileges and inmaunities to
(a) 11 Coke's Rep. 85.
which such persons were entitled -s citizens of the
state re protected by this section of the Amendment.
The ,rivilees incidental t o citizenship of' the state
w'ere declared to be those which are fundamental- The
rights here cAaimed were of this nature, . Hence their
protection must be given by the state. Third, The ap-
pellants had not been deprived of their property with-
out due process of law. The phrase, it ,1as said, was a
peculiar one. It was used in the fifth amendmbent. It
occurred in most of the state constitutions. It had
been often construed, but under no admissible construc-
tion could it be held to apply to the cases in hand.
Fourth, neither had the appellants been deprived of the
equal protoction of the laws. That phrLtse was held to
have been inserted in the amendment for the protection
of the newly enfr .nchised negroes. Doubt w'%as expressed
whether any case not involving a discrimination against
these people could ever be held covered by this provis-
ion. The opinion concluded:- "Whatever fluctuations
may be seen in the history of public opinion on this sub.
ject during the period of our natural existence, we
think it will be found that this court , so far as its
functions required, has always held with a steady and e-
yen hand the balance between state arl Federal power, and
we trust that such may continue to be the history of its
relations to that subject so long as it shall have duties
to perform which demand of it a construction of the con-
sttitution" Prom this decision four judges most earnest-
ly dissented, denying every proposition there laid down.
At the same term was decided the case of Bradwell v.
State, (a) Mrs. Bradwell, because of her sex, had been
iefused admission to the bar of Illinois. She appealed
from the decision of the stat e court on the ground that
her Itivileges as a citizen of the United States were a-
bridged. It -,as Yeld that tle right to practice law in
a state court was not one of the privileges attaching
to citizenship of tie United States andher appeal vas de-
nied. Three of the judges who dissented from the decis-
ion in the Slaughter House cases concurred in this opin-
ion but were careful to put their concurrence of the
-round thai there were fundamental differences between
the fundamental rights of the sexes.
The phrase"due p'rocess of law" received careful con-
sideration from Mr. Justice Miller in Davidson v. New
(a 16 Vall. 130.
Orb ans .(a) In 1hat case real esta'e be onging to the
aprellant had been heavily dssessed for the Jurpos,:£
draining swamps near the city of New Orleans. T, e tax
having been eld valid by the state courts Davidson am-
pealdd on the ground 'chat he was deprived of his i roperty
without duo -rocess of law The opinion of the court
held that this lihrase was equivalent to "The law (f 1 he
land" as used in Magna Charta, that it had never been
satisfactortly defined; that the policy of the court
would be to determine its meaning by the gradual process
of inclusion and exclusion as new cases should arise;
but Lhat it did not necessarily require a regular rroceed
ing in a coui't of justice. As to the case in hand, these
propositions were advanced:- " Whenever by the lawVs of a
state or b- state authority, a state tax, assessirsnt
servitude t (ther burden is imposed on p'roperty for pub-
lic use, whether it be for the whole state or some limit-
d Lortion oIf the community and the laws irovide for a
mode of confining or controlling 'he charge thues impos-
ed in the ordinary courts of justice w,,ith ,uch notice to
the person or such proceeding in regard to the Trop rt y
as is aplropriate to the nature cf the case, the judg-
(a) S . 97.
iiient in such a case cmn not be said to d' Prive the ow:fn-
or of his 1-ro porty without dzi process of law howev-r ob-
noxious it Jiay be from other objections." As the c: se
was covered by these propositions "he appeal was denied.
This deoisinn -,,as in accord with the doctrine of the pro-
viously decided case (f McMillan v. Anderson (a) where it
was held that the selling of goods for taxes un er a
statute which req''ired ten dais notice to the owner did
not deprive him of his property without due p-rocess of
]aw. In Kelly v. Pittsburgh(b) the appellant owned
land which he desired to use for agricultural purposes
e<clusivelh. In pursuance of an act passed bV the legis
lature rf Pennsylvania the corporate limits of the city
of Pittsburgh was so extended as to include this land.
As a result the taxes thereon were extraordinarily in
creased. Kelly asked relief from the Federal court on
the ground that he was deprived of his pro]erty without
due prouess of law. The court rerlied that the act of
t-le legislature wby which it was made possible to extend
the corporate limits (f the city was wholly in its own
discretion, and That while the tax was exceedingly -n-
() 95 U. S. 37.(b) 104 U. S. 7(P.
just the coiirt could not judicially say tlt the owner
received no benifits from the purposaes for wlich the tax
-eas levied.
It is a cutious fact that in all the opinions of
Mr. Justice Miller in Jich he ex]?laimed -nd construed
the XIV. ail-endr.cient, in but a single ene did he uv r hold
that the rights claimedin the case a t bar were protect-
ed by- the 'rovisions of this amendi-hnt. Here iie was
surelyv a strict constructionist.
C 1! A 2 T E R VI.
DECISIONS CONSIDERING PRIVILEGES OF REPRESENTATIVES?,
EXTRADITION AND T1E ILIPLIED POWERS OF CONGRESS.
I. "...... . and for' anyspeech or debate in
either house they _shall not be questione d in any
othe r __Lace.%rt. I. Sec. 6, Const.)
II. "The Congress shall have ,o-yer to make all laws
which shall be necessary and rroper for carrying in-
to execution the fore ngpowers; and all other
jooprs vested by this Constitution in the ,overnment
o@ th-e United States, or in any depratment or offi-
cer thereof"-(Art. I. Sec. 8 Clause 1F Const.)
A very learned opinion as dell s inte.-est ing is
that of Kilbourn v. Thompson. (a) Kilboun w-s, by order
of the speaker of the House of Representatives, sent to
jail for contempt in refusing to answer questions before
an investigating comgittee alppointcd by the house, and
Thompson wes Sengeant at Arfs took him into custody;. He
after Jards :sued Thompson and the fi erfbers of the llo- se
(a) 103 U. S i
vffho,proc-red his arrest for inlawful imi~risonment. The
case .reached the Supremre court by a writ (f error to the
highest court of the District of Colutmbia. That court
had decided that, because of the privileges of the House
of Representatives, Kilbourn could not i-ointain his suit.
The Supreme court discussed the questions involved at
reat length. It was unanimously held that the Consti-
tution conferred no express power on either house of
congress to punish for contempt, and that the power could
not be implied from the fact of its exercise by the
House of Con-nons because there it is derived from cus-
toms of the times when Bishops, Lords, Knights and Bur'-
gesses all met in the sane body and exerciseed judicial
functions as the "High Court of Parliament".
The committee before which Kilbourn refused to tes-
tify had been appointed for the purpose of investigating
a real estate pool with which Jay Cooke was supposed to
be connected, Cooke being at the time a creditor of the
government and his affairs in process of adjudication by
a Federal court. The action of the House in appointing
such a co±Llittee at this time was declared to be an un-
constitutional ancroaciuient on the rights of the Judici l
departnent of the government and the resolutions of the
House together with the warrant of the Speaker under
which Kilbourn was ii.mprisoned was held null and void.
However, it was further held that the nembers of the
Huuse who instigated the arrest were protected from a
suit for damages by the constitutional provision that for
words spoken in the House in debate members could not be
questioned in any other place. That provision was held
to protect the members of Congress not -nly as to words
spoken in actual debate bitt as to written reports of com-
mittees made; resolutions offered and votes taken- in
short to anything done by members of the House in rela-
tion tot he business before it. In accord with these
views the decision of the lower court denying Kilbourn's
right to maintain his action was sust- ined as to the mem-
bers of the House but reversed as to the Sergeant at Arms
United States v. Rauscher (a) came before th e
court on certificate of division from a circuit court
sitting in New York. Rauscher had been extradited from
England on the charge of murder for which he had been in-
dieted. Instead of proceeding agaisnt han under this i.
dictrnent he was arraigned, tried and convicted on the
(a) 119 U. 407.
charge of having inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.
The opinion of the Supreme court was asked as to whether,
under these circumstances, the lower court had jurisdic-
tion to try him for this second offence. The reply of
the court discu,3sed the subject of extradition at length
holding that the exercise of the power rests exclusively
with the National government and not the states; that an
ex tradited person cannot be tried for an offence other
than that for which he was extradited, until he has been
released and given a reasonable time to return to the
country from which he was taken. It was further held
that this view must control in the case under consider-
at ion although the evidence on which the ext5adition of
Rauscher was secured was precisely the same evidence as
that on which he was indicted for the second offence.
The case was undoubtedly well decided. Any other rule
would be extremely unfair to a nation delivering up a fu-
gitive from justice.
One of the most powerful opinions ever written by
M;r. Justice M~iller was rendered in his dissent to the de-
cision of the cort in Hepburn v. Griswold. (a) That case
marked the beginning of the famous struggle as to whether
S -------------------------------------------
(a) 8 Wall. 603.
Congress had power to make the noted and obligations of
the governent a legal tender in payment of debts. The
facts were these; in June of 1860 1irs. }iepburn gave to
Griswold her note for $11 250. At that time only gold
and silver were legal tender. Five days after this note
matured Congress passed an act making notes of the United
States legal tender for all debts, publis anc private,
with one or two exceptions not necessary to be mentioned
here. The note of Mrs. Hepburn remaining unpaid and
Griswold having brought st.it thereon, She finally tender-
ed the full amount due, both principal andinter)st, in
United States notes whic h ahld been issued under th$i&
act of Zongress. The tender was refused. After dif-
ferent decisions by: the state courts, the case was fi-
nally carried to the Supreme court wlere, after a long
andcareful consideration, the court having heard argu-
ments from more than 15 of the ablest constitutional law-
yers .n the country on the question involved, the tender
was declared invalid inan opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice Chase, with whom fo*4 other judges concurred, the
court at that time being compoeed of ebght members.
The argument of Chief Justice Chase was remarkably
clear. It was held: First, that the intent of Congress
as expressed in the wards of the statute was to make U-
nited States notes a valid tender for the payment of
debts contracted before as ,ell as those contracted af-
ter the enactment of the statute. Iecond, that the pow-
er to do this was not conferred on Congress by any ex-
press _frant in the Constitition. Third, neither could -
authority for the exercise of this r-ower be found in that
provision of the Constitution g~ranting to Congress power
to make necessary and proper laws for carrying into exe-
cution the express powers granted. Fourth, the powers of
Congress being limited to such as were expressly granted
or necessarily implied from those powers expressly grant-
ed, it followed that the act of Congress was ultra #ires
and therefore void.
The greater part of the i.revailing opinion was giv-
en to the statement of the argument that the validity of
the legal tender act could not be sustained under the
theory of implied powers. This argunrent was based on
the famous canon of construction laid down by Chief Jus-
tice iarshall in hicCullough v. Mlaryland (a) as follows:3
"Let the end be legitimate, 'Iat it be within the scope
of the Constitution, and all mans which are appropriate
(a) 4 Wheat. 421.
which are plainly adapted to that end, wlich are not pro-
hibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution are constitutional". With the propositions
laid down in this canon as r remises, the argument pro-
ceeds to show that neither to the powers of Congress to
borrow or coin money nor to issue notes, nr to carry on
war was this act making noted of the United States a le-
gal tender for pre-existing debts a means appropriate or
plainly adapted. Doubt as expressed as to whether the
legal tender qualities of the notes added anything what-
ever to their value. It was pointed out that the noted
first issued ,,fithout being made legal tenders circula-s
ted freely and without discount. It was urged, moreover,
that the act in question was incbnsistent with the rule
laid down by Larshall because inconsistent with the let-
ter and spirit of the Constitut ion. It violated the car-
dinal principle of that instrument - the establishment of
justice .6. by impairing the obligations of contracts.
It was contrary to the spirit of the provision of the
Constitution forbidding private property to be taken for
public use without just compensation. It violated that
caluse of the Fifth Amenchrent, -roviding that no perv n
should be deprived of his property without due process of
la y.
In the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice 1,iller,
with Whom concurred Justices Swain and Davis, after point
ing out the fi ct that Congress was not expressly forbid-
den either to make the notes of the government legal ten-
der not to pass a law impairing the obligations of con-
tract, and conceding ti-at in the powers granted to coin
money, to regulate its value and to punish counterfeitin-
could not be found sufficient warrant for the exercise
of this power, proceeded to argue the question whether
the legal tender act could be sustained by the Law nec-
essary and proper at the tine it was enacted, for carry-
ing into execution ahy of the powers exTressly granted.
After quoting at length from the discussion of the im-
p-lied powers by Chief Justice ":arshall in the case of
(a)
The United States v. Fisher and r-cCullough v. Maryland
the opinion continued:- "I have cited at unusual length
these remarks of Chief Justice 1,arshall because, though
made half a century ago, their applicability to the cir-
cumstanes under -hich Congress called to its aid the pow-
er o making the securities of the government a legal
tender as a rieans of successfully prosecuting a war which
(a) 2 Cranch, 259.
without such aid seemed likely to termirate its existence
and to borrow money which could in no other manner be
horrowed and to pay the debt of millions due to its sol-
diers in the field which could by no other means be
paid, seems to be almos-, prophetic. the pow-
er to declare war; to suppress insurrection, to raise and
support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to bor-
row money on the dredit of the United "States; to pay the
debts of the Union, and to provide for the commnn defence
and welfare are all distinctly and specifically granted
in spparate clauses of the Constitution -- -- VWe were in
the midst of a war which c-lied all these powers into ex-
ercise : nd taxed them severely. all the ordirarr
means of rendering efficient the several powers of Con-
gress above mentioned had been enlarged to their utmost
capacity a general collapse of credit, of payrent
and of business seemed inevitable, in which faith in the
ability of the go v ernnent would have been destroyed,
the Rebellion would have triumphed, the st-tes would have
been divided and the people impoverished- The National
government would have perished and with it the constitu-
tion whaih we are called upon to construe with such nice
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and critical accuracy." I have quoted so freely form
this ()pinion simply because it seemed impossible by any
analysis to do justice to the nagnificent argument which
it cont-ins; and because, in my own opinion, it illus-
trates the mannier and powers of reasoning of 1'r. Justice
Miller better than any other oyinion he ever penned.
-T A P T E R VII.
0-
REMARKS OF THE WORK AND CONSTITUTIOAL OPINIONS
01" . JUSTICE .iILLER.
0-
M.r. Justice Miller has universally been conceded
high rank as an expounder of our Constitution. The re-
gard in which he is held is limited to no section of
the ccintry and to the followers of no nne political par-
ty or creed. All grantl to him due honor as a judge
who was fearless; whose private life was spotless; whose
sincerity and intellectual ability was unquestionable.
His, I thimk, was genius in the rough.' Ae lacked the pol-
ish of the schools; but he had that for which, when lack-
ing , the schools can never compensate - a large degree
of conimon sense. His style of reasoning reminds us of a
brawny KenTuckian mauling rails. Tie always sent the
wedge home. His cumulative sentences are in striking
contrast with the polished ones of Eradley; in analysis
he was equalled by Field; in legal lore he was probably
excelled by Gray; Hle could not put so much :ieaning into
a single sentence as &hse; but he excelled them all in
that highest form of tudicial reasoning - judicial in-
tuition. Therein was his power. He was somewhat care-
less of precedent. The facts once before him and in a
flash he reached a conclusirn in consonaire with justice.
To the bar of justice he would havy sunmoned sovereignty
itself. 'ihe doctrine that the king can do no wrong
found little favor at his hands.(a)
As to F articular opinions various views are enter-
tained. With the dissent in Ex T!:rte Garland I cannot
agree. ieither can I agree with the view of Professor
Pomeroy(b) that the doctrine of that dissent would be
correct if applied to the cj-ses of these, who, imnlike
Garland, had not previously acquired a"vested right" to
practice law. In either case tI-e act of Conc ress did
essentially propose to inflict punishment. That there
is a clear distinction between the rights of one already
admitted to the bar, and an applicant dor admission is not
denied. But it at by no menas follo-cis that to deprive
one already admitted to the right to practice would a-
mount to punishemift While to deprive another, not admittd
of his capacity to be admitted would not amount to pun-
ishmant. The constitution itself prescribes disqualifi-
cation from ever holding any office of profit or trust
(a) U. . v. Lee, 106 U. 3. 196.
(bO Pomeroy on Const. Law, p. 464.
as a punislmnent for certain crimes.(a) Surely it will
not be asserted that this does not inflict punishnrmnt;
but I have yet to see the man who is hardy enough to as-
sert that he has a"vested right" to hold office in the
future under the government of the United States. In
In re Cooper (b) a case in which Professor Dwight ap-
peared as counsel, it was held that in admitting attor-
neys to the bar the court acts judicially, and that ev-
ery qualified applicant has a s~bstantial right to be
admitted. Can we say that q law which, for past offen-
ces takes away substantial rights, inflicts no punish-
ment?
True, ts the dis.ienting opinion urged, ex post fac-
to laws are, or should be, enforced only in criminal pro-
ceedings. rue the re-admiesion of Gnrland was a pro-
ceeding which was, or ought to have been, wholly civil in
its nature. But can Congress be permitted to avoid this
safeguard of the Constitution rmerely by providing that
its otherwise inhibited decrees shall be carried out and
its otherwise inhibited punisment inflicted in a pro-
ceeding of a nature wholly civil? Indeed, tle most o-
(a) Art. I., Sec. 3 Clause 7 U. S. Const.
(b) 22 L. y. 67.
diousness feature Bf the law in question wasin the fact
',!at it essentially provided for tle 1,unishment of an of-
fene in a proceeding of a civil nature ,here persons
could be compelled to give testimony against themselves
,nd where no one of those peculiar and sacr-d safeguards
which exp erience has proved to be necessary for the pro-
tection of Tersons accused of crime could be invoked.
In no other case in which Elr. Justice .Iiller was called
on to expound this clause of the Constitution did he rrive
it such a narrow meaning. In Kring v. Missouri and in
In re Medley he favored a very liberal rule of construc-
tion in the opinion of some too liberal to be consistent
witht the safety of society. In the first of these last
n-entirned cases he adopts views of the majority in 'x pat
te Garland and adds another to the then recognized class-
es of ex post facto laws - an addition which, in this
dissenting opiniot he asserted had never be n attempted
by any commentator on or expounder of the aonstitution.
I do not wish to beunderttood as criticising these
later opigion4 Ex post facto laws are so obnoxious from
an ethical standpdint and so closely intrerwoven with
many of the darkest legislative crimes that blot the pa-
ges of English history that I have come to believe every
law of a retrospective n ture should be jealously regard-
ed by the courts and this I rovision of the Constitut ion
most liberally construed although at times a Kring or a
Ledley shoid thereby escape just puhishment.
Of his decisions maintaining the exclusive rirht of
Congress to control comr.merce between the states and be-
tween the United States and foreign nations it can be
truly said that they deserve high commendation. The doc-
trines laid down in Gibi-ons v. Ogden(a) and Brown v.
Maryland(b) were always so far as his influence went,
fearlessly applied and extedned to meet new conditions
and circumstares -(c) The doctrine is not without its
disadvantages. Leisy v. Hardin(d) was its logical and
necessary result but even should this doctrine have re-
sulted in the destruction of the interesting experiments
of the prohibitionists in reg rd to the control of the
liquor traffic it would have been more than compensated
for in the blessings of a commerse unrestricted by the
dictates of local prej'udices and unfettered by the de-
crees of stL?,te legislatures.
(a) 9 Wheat. 1.
(b) 12 Wheat. 419.
(c)Clinton Bridge Case, 1 Voolworth, 150.(d) 135 U. S. 100.
The dissenting opinio;1 in Wfashington University v.
Rouse lays down a doctrine which aside from stare decisis
ought tundoubtedly to control. -. o poer is more essent&
tial to the existence of sovereignty thanthat of taxa-
tion. The police powers, the adk-inistration of jus-
tice, support of public institutions - in fe ct every
purpoee for which gover nment is instdtutud, depends on
the exercise of this power. In our theory of *government
vnder written constitutions the legislature is but the a-
gent of the sovereign po, ,er. When going beyond the au-
thority expressly granted it presumes to barter away the
power essential to the existence of the state itself I
can see no reasdn why the familiar rule of agency that
contracts made by an agent without the afithority of his
principal are, as against that principal, unenforceable,
should not be rigorously applied.
Of the dissent in Hepburn v. 6'riswold, it has been
well said:-- "It presents adequately andin full force the
arguments and principles which must constitute the sole
defence of the legal tender acts't(a) To discuss the
questions involved would require an entire volume rather
(a) 18 Am. Law Review, 414.
than the few word s I can give it here. Clearly under no
express provision of he Constitut ion can authority for
this legislation be found. The ylain meaaing of the
words used must be distorted; the history of the forma-
tion of the Constitution disregarded; the authority of
such eminent constitutional lawyers as ,'ebster and Story
trampled -inder foot before we can assert that the Consti-
tution by express grant or by inference, gives Congress
authority In times of peace to make ndteds of the United
States a legal tender in the paynntof debte. Is Con-
gress granted that power by inference in time of war? I
believe that the dissenting opinio#. in this case direct-
ly holds this to be so, and thal the argument htere ad-
vanced, drawn from the necessities of the goverrment in
the dark hours of the rebellion, remains unanswered and
is unanswerable. Beyond that opinion I doi not think
the courts should ever have gone. In Julliard v. Gree-
man(a) must always stand as a sad illustration of Feder-
alism gone mad.
Writing of the decision in the Slaughtering House
Cases in 1875, Professor Pomeroy expressed the opinion
that it could hardly be regarded as final; that the de-
(a) 110 U. S.
Cisision might have been put on other grounds, and that
in his 6pinion the views of the minority would in time
come to be accepted. Thii prophecy has not been ful-
filled. The relation of the states to the Federal gov-
ernment era ins unchanged(a) •
It was pardonable pride, when speaking before the
law students of the 11ational University at Washington,
i,,Ir. Justice Liiller himself said:- "Although this deeis-
ion did not meet the approval of 6our out of nine of the
judges on some points on which it rested yet public sen-
timent as found in the press and in the universal acqui-
escence which it received, accepted it with great unan-
imity; and although there were intimations that in the
legislative branch of the government the opinion would
be reviewed and criticized unfavorably, no such thing
has occurred in the fifteen years which have elapsed
since it was delivered. The necessity of the
great powers conceded by the Constitution originally to
the Federal government and the equal necessity of the
autonomy of the states and their power toregulate their
domestic affairs remain as the great feature of our com-
plex form of government" .(b)
(a) In re Kernmler, 136 U. . 436.
(b) Liller on the Const. of the U. ;., p. 412.
These words were spoken in the spring of 1890. In
the Autumn of the same year the kind hearted but brave
and fearle ;s jurist who tttered them passed to his re-
4
ward. This great decision rhis fitting monument;
for it is not too much to say that because of it our gov-
ernment remains an "indestructible union of indestructi-
ble states,,. A.Y,
____-0
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